Thank you, Madam Chair. And thanks for calling

this very important hearing.

I am once again grateful to the U.S. military personnel and our

coalition forces for their courage, professionalism, and tenacity they

have exhibited in executing their orders to implement U.N. Security

Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. While our forces have heroically

taken on yet another combat mission in the Near East and

performed extremely well, I am nevertheless deeply concerned

about our use of force in Libya, and more particularly about the

path this administration took to bring us to this point. And I know

the Under Secretary will answer our questions, and so very ably

as he has done an extraordinary job as Under Secretary, but I

would like to know when we first initiated military action did the

administration who, exactly who, the leaders of the rebel forces

were? What are their aspirations for a post-Ghadafi Libya? Are

they surging or have they given commitments that they will seek

a democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights? I think

that is all very important, especially when we risk the lives of our

men and women in uniform to give them air support.

I have a number of other questions, but I am out of time.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much Deputy Secretary Steinberg for your testimony.

I agree no ground troops, but frankly, why tell Ghadafi?

Secondly, when we first initiated military action, did we know

who the rebels were and their plans for a post-Ghadafi Libya, especially

as it relates to human rights, rule of law, and democracy?

Third, are the rebel fights defined civilians as in the relevant

U.N. Security Council resolutions authorization of force?

And how is bad weather affecting the ability to deploy our air

power?

And finally, given the fact that Ghadafi has engaged in international

terrorism, obviously we all know how horrific the consequences

of that has been, what is his current ability to strike at

our interests outside of Libya? Does not his ability to use asymmetric

means to hit back at us increase the longer he remains in

power?

If the Secretary would yield on that? So that nothing

would preclude an Arab force or some other hybrid force, AU whatever

it might be, from going in?

On the issue of the terrorism and his ability to

strike?

Just finally, I remember reading the book Sun Tzu’s

‘‘The Art of War.’’ He made a very powerful statement, many of

them, one of them, ‘‘Let your plans be dark and as impenetrable

as night and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.’’

And when the President said all options are on the table, obviously

the Intelligence Committees and key Members of Congress

need to know. And I think there is no support for ground troops,

I certainly do not support it, but again telling Ghadafi, I think may

unwittingly, and I mean that, unwittingly convey to him that he

has other options and he is not as at risk as he might otherwise

be. So, you know just going forward I would hope the key Members

of Congress, especially the Intelligence Committee and the leadership

be apprised, but for a short period of time some ambiguity

might be helpful to ensure his demise.